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Of Fools and Curveballs
...Quoth the Commission: "Virtually all of the Intelligence Community’s information on Iraq’s alleged mobile biological weapons facilities was supplied by a source, codenamed 'Curveball,' who was a fabricator." (Or, in the real world, a "liar" or a "con artist.")

Curveball was an Iraqi chemical engineer who was sent to American intelligence through a "foreign liaison." But, in a way that wouldn't be admissible in any court of law because we'd call it "hearsay," the U.S. didn't formally interview the obliging Curveball because, it seems, Mr. Ball wouldn't speak to Americans and, besides, it was claimed, Curveball didn't speak English. "That liaison service debriefed Curveball and then shared the debriefing results with the United States. The foreign liaison service would not, however, provide the United States with direct access to Curveball. Instead, information about Curveball was passed from the liaison service to DIA’s Defense HUMINT Service, which in turn disseminated information about Curveball throughout the Intelligence Community."

From January 2000 to September 2001, the U.S. got 100 reports from Curveball's keepers about the magical biological weapons labs in Iraq. Yes, the Commission says, Curveball's lies were incorporated into the National Intelligence Estimate, which goes to "senior policymakers," but that NIE, under Clinton, contained this caveat: "[w]e cannot confirm whether Iraq has produced . . . biological agents." Notice the way that works: the Intelligence people actually put in that they were unsure.

The Commission then says, "By 2001, however, the assessments became more assertive." Yup, with the rise of the Bush regime, they were pushin' that biological weapons story like so much coke to college students. The tone of the reports changed to more definite assessments, based solely on Curveball's tales, that Iraq was producing biological weapons from these roving labs. This change in tone was most clearly reflected when George Tenet said to Congressional committees, "We know Iraq has developed a redundant capability to produce biological warfare agents using mobile production units." All info courtesy of you-know-who.

"The October 2002 NIE reflected the shift from the late-1990s assessments that Iraq could have biological weapons to the definitive conclusion that Iraq 'has' biological weapons, and that its BW program was larger and more advanced than before the Gulf War," says the Commission. And the emphasis on "could" is the Commission's. It continues, "For this conclusion, the NIE relied primarily on reporting from Curveball." CB hit the big time when Colin Powell used CB's info in his big ol' pack o' lies he shat in front of the U.N. General Assembly in February 2003.

But, alas, sweet Curveball was not what he seemed. He was not straight and down the middle. He . . . how shall this be put . . . curved. The Defense Department sent a "detailee" to meet with Monsieur Ball way back in May 2000 to see if Le Ball was telling le truth about being in a biological weapons accident. Oh, let's let the Commission speak for itself here:

"First, the detailee observed that Curveball spoke excellent English during their meeting.286 This was significant to the detailee because the foreign service had, on several earlier occasions, told U.S. intelligence officials that one reason a meeting with Curveball was impossible was that Curveball did not speak English. Second, the detailee was concerned by Curveball’s apparent 'hangover' during their meeting. The detailee conveyed these impressions of Curveball informally to CIA officials, and WINPAC [the Center for Weapons, Intelligence, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control] BW analysts told Commission staff that they were aware that the detailee was concerned that Curveball might be an alcoholic."

Said the poor detailee in a hurried e-mail sent to the CIA Directorate of Operations, "I do have a concern with the validity of the information based on Curveball having a terrible hangover the morning of [the meeting]. I agree, it was only a one time interaction, however, he knew he was to have a [meeting] on that particular morning but tied one on anyway. What underlying issues could this be a problem with and how in depth has he been vetted by the [foreign liaison service]?" When was this sent? The night before Colin Powell's presentation to the U.N. In 2003....